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SHOULD GOD NOT HAVE CREATED ADAM? 
Evan Fales 
"This unembellished telling is a terrible 
accusation against God and humanity." 
-Professor Yehuda Bauer, in the 
Introduction to Filip Muller's 
Eyewitness Auschwitz 
The free will defense shows that God cannot be held responsible, in general, 
for the existence of manmade evil. But, I argue, the defense fails to exculpate 
God if it can be shown that there are ways God could have fashioned human 
nature, consistent with our freedom (or increasing it), that would have re-
sulted in our being less evil. I discuss two such ways. The second half of the 
paper considers various defenses of the free will defense against this chal-
lenge, including two more general responses to the argument from evil due 
to Wykstra and Marilyn McCord Adams. 
I 
Alvin Plantinga has convinced most of us-if indeed, we were not already 
convinced-that the free will defense exonerates God from the imputation of 
a certain kind of incapacity. Not even an omnipotent being can guarantee the 
best of all possible worlds, for if such a world must contain created free 
beings, it will be partly up to them what transpires. I Let us agree therefore 
that if God creates a world, he ought to create one containing free agents. To 
be sure, even setting aside the matter of free agents, it has been held, by 
Aquinas and many others, that among the finite possible worlds there is no 
unique best one; hence, no particular one that God is bound to create. Nev-
ertheless, there are worlds sufficiently bad that God has adequate reason not 
to create them. I will defend the view that our world is one of these-and 
that it is so precisely on account of the free agents it contains, if for no other 
reason. Although God ought, if he creates a world, to create one with free 
agents, there are free agents that God would have a sufficient reason not to 
create. We are among the agents of this sort: so I shall argue. 
The argument is straightforward. Human beings, who are among the free 
agents of this world, are defective in a number of ways. Among their defects 
are two I shall single out, that are such that: (a) God could have created us 
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without them; (b) it is virtually certain that His having done so would result 
in an enormously smaller quantity of humanly produced evil; and (c) in so 
doing He would not in any way have limited or infringed upon our freedom. 
Unless the theist can show that the evil that results from these defects is not 
gratuitous-and that would amount to mounting a theodicy quite distinct from 
the free will defense itself-we can conclude that if a God were to create 
human beings, He would have sufficient reason to create them with a nature 
different from the one we find in ourselves. In that case, contrary to what is 
commonly supposed, the free will defense does not by itself vindicate every 
humanly produced evil. 
II 
We know that children are born with a wide range of temperaments. They 
carry these character traits into adulthood, modified and influenced of course 
by the circumstances under which they mature. An aggressive nature will be 
tempered by gentle surroundings; a gentle nature can be made vicious by 
vicious mentors. We know, too, that, other things being equal, those who have 
a benevolent nature tend to cause far less mischief than those who are ag-
gressive. They instill benevolence in their children, and in others who might 
be less inclined to it than they. They generally abhor violence, and seek out 
opportunities to serve others. 
No one supposes that persons who are born with a generous disposition 
are, by virtue of this natural endowment over which they have no control, 
rendered less capable of exercising free choice than persons of vicious tem-
perament,2 No one imagines that environmental influences, over which an 
individual has no control, limit his or her freedom more stringently if they 
tend to produce gentleness than if they tend to produce aggressiveness. 
We know, further, that different ranges of temperament are characteristic 
of different species. Gorillas tend toward a marked mildness of nature; ba-
boons are decidedly contentious. Human beings are in this respect more akin 
to the baboons. 
But God could have made it otherwise. He could have made us, as a species, 
far more inclined toward cooperation and kindness. Had He done so, He 
would have virtually guaranteed an enormous decrease in the human produc-
tion of harm. Moreover, this state of affairs would not diminish the extent of 
human freedom, at the same time that it assured that we would more often 
choose the good than in this world we do. Nor are there compensatory evils 
which this change would engender and which would cancel its benefits. 
These are empirical claims. I shall consider shortly some objections to 
them. But we do believe them: almost no one will, upon reflection, deny that 
this would be a better world if people were more disposed to be kind toward 
one another and toward other living beings. If we thought otherwise, we 
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would not value generosity and attempt to foster it. And let us be clear that 
it is not only the valuing itself or the attempts that we value, but generosity 
itself. 
It follows that a God, if He created human beings, has a sufficient reason 
to make them gentler, as a species, than we in fact are.3 This conclusion does 
not require us to believe that aggressiveness and unkindness are never bene-
ficial. It does not require us to deny that some degree of innate aggressiveness 
is desirable. It merely demands a recognition that humans are aggressive to 
a far greater degree than is optimal-and that the toll in suffering, human and 
animal, that has followed is not matched by any sufficiently compensatory 
good. 
Perhaps, to be sure, there is no single combination of inherent characteris-
tics that is optimal for created beings that have the exercise of free will. Or 
perhaps there are many possible species of free agents that God would have 
an adequate reason to create, whether or not they embodied the highest 
creaturely form of free agency. God could not be faulted for creating such 
non-optimal agents; nor, of course, can He be faulted for failing to create the 
uniquely most perfect form of creaturely agency, if there be none such. But 
He would be at fault if it was He who created human beings. For human 
beings are the cause-and not solely in virtue of their freedom or anything 
necessarily connected with it-of an immense quantity of delegated gratu-
itous evil. If so, then God, in creating us, has performed an act which is itself 
an undelegated gratuitous evil. 
III 
Most human beings are born with the capacity to acquire a reasonably good 
knowledge of their surroundings, of the regularities that govern those sur-
roundings, and (hence) of at least some of the probable consequences of 
actions that they contemplate. This knowledge serves to guide the choices 
they make, and those choices may in turn lead to an increase in that knowl-
edge. But our means of acquiring knowledge are imperfect, our efforts fraught 
with uncertainty and error. Much human evil is the result of human ignorance. 
Ignorance causes not only the misfiring of well-intentioned plans; but is also 
responsible, at least in part, for prejudice and malice of various kinds. Intel-
ligence and education are widely agreed to be among the most effective 
antidotes to moral ignorance. Intelligence and education benefit not only 
those who otherwise would be morally ignorant, but arms those who are in 
a position to oppose the actions of the malevolent. 
To make matters concrete, consider an event such as the Holocaust. It is 
surely improbable-is it not?-that this evil would have occurred, had it been 
the case that: (1) Hitler had known from an early age the history and culture 
of the Jews, their contribution to the general culture of Europe, and most 
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importantly, their common humanity, their capacity for suffering, and, in a 
vivid way, the horrors that the death-camps were to produce, if (2) everyone 
else had known these things; and if (3) Hitler had known that everyone else 
knew these things. 
We can concede that no amount of knowledge or intelligence insures that 
a man will not possess an evil will; and indeed, an obdurately evil man is the 
more dangerous the more he knows. But unless it be supposed that human 
beings are innately more disposed toward harm than toward good,4 it can 
hardly be doubted that education and intelligence are good things. 
God could have given us more knowledge; or alternatively, a greater intel-
ligenceS with which to acquire it ourselves. Had He done so, there would be 
far less human wickedness. Would He, in so doing, have impaired human 
freedom? Clearly not. He would, on the contrary, have increased our capacity 
for free choice. The ability to think intelligently and rationally, to foresee the 
probable consequences of our actions, to deliberate quickly and accurately, 
to understand what we can hope to achieve and what we cannot, to recognize 
our own weaknesses-these all require intelligence and knowledge. Had He 
made us epistemically more perfect, God would have increased our freedom 
and simultaneously assured a vast decrease in the amount of human harm. 
How much more knowledgeable would God have a reason to make us? 
Could God have any reason for making us less than omniscient?6 I think not. 
God could not create another omnipotent being. And arguably, He could not 
create us both free and morally perfect. Perhaps it is true that moral perfection 
(if this entails an inability to will evil) is incompatible with the sort of 
freedom that it is desirable for us to have. But neither these considerations 
nor (so far as I can see) any others constrain God to limit our intelligence or 
our knowledge.7 
There are thus two things God could have done, in creating us, the result 
of which would have been a vast improvement in the human condition, and 
a vast reduction in human and animal suffering: He could have made us 
smarter, and He could have made us nicer. Could a good God have any 
sufficient reason to forego such improvements? 
IV 
I come now to some objections which might be made on behalf of theodicy. 
These take the form of (1) suggesting sufficient reasons that God might have 
for not having made in our stead an improved version of the human race; and 
(2) arguing that we have no reason to suppose there not to be such reasons, 
even if we do not know what they are. 
The most plausible objection of the first sort, I think, is this. The struggle 
for survival being the precarious business it is, only those creatures whose 
traits afford them protection from their competitors will survive. It is this 
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mechanism of Darwinian evolution that brought into being human agents. 
But success as a species has required of us a certain degree of aggressive-
ness-the very degree which, as a species, we exhibit. Moreover, the devel-
opment of inteIligence through evolutionary mechanisms is a slow process. 
If our inteIligence as a species is less than ideal, that is because this process 
has not had sufficient time to work its benefits. If God has a sufficient reason 
to bring about human existence through the processes of Darwinian evolution, 
then the complaint that He should have straight off made us brighter and more 
benign is unfounded. 
At first sight this will seem a weak objection. Just possibly (though indeed, 
this is hardly likely), evolutionary processes are causally necessary for the 
creation of human life. Yet if God is not constrained by causal laws, would 
not the preventability of a vast amount of suffering provide a moral impera-
tive for the contravening of those laws? 
Against this, theists can and haveS argued that God has reason to create a 
world governed by laws, one of the consequences of which will be the exis-
tence of certain harm-producing features. Moreover, one of the reasons God 
has for doing this-viz, to provide his creatures with an environment of 
patterned regularities which will enable them to learn and to foresee the 
consequences of contemplated actions-is a reason which must forestall God 
from frequent or capricious intervention in the natural course of events. To 
do so would undermine the use of past experience as a guide to action; and 
it could undermine as well the grounds we have for assuming responsibility 
for our actions. 
These are serious considerations, yet I think they will hardly serve to 
deflect my challenge to theodicy. First, because even if Darwinian evolution 
is the mechanism of choice for the creation of inteIligent agents on earth, it 
is clear that God could have intervened (e.g. by making human intelligence 
develop very rapidly, and in such a way as to compensate for any loss of 
competitive advantage incurred by his taming our shrewishness) in such a 
way that we would not discover this. Second, because even if we did discover 
this miracle, and discerned its cause, we would surely praise God for having 
performed it. Had we discovered it but been unable to fathom its explanation 
(i.e. God's agency), we would have been presented with an enduring puzzle 
for science. But such puzzles we will probably always have with us in any 
case: they are a small price to pay for a more felicitous world. Theists have 
never been loath to allow the propriety of God's performing some miracles 
for human benefit; it would be out of order for them to cavil here. 
Thirdly, if we had much greater knowledge and understanding, we would 
be in a much better position to recognize God's wisdom when He did inter-
vene to prevent suffering, and not to make the mistake of taking this to 
unsettle our grounds for relying upon the regularities of nature. Nor would 
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we be as prone to the mistake of supposing that one is absolved of moral 
responsibility for a maliciously intended action, just because (for what ever 
reason), that action fails to have the intended consequences. We can disagree 
with Steven Boer's claim9 that God could have preserved human freedom 
while causing every action motivated by evil intentions to misfire, and also 
with Swinburne's countersuggestionlO that it is a condition of human respon-
sibility that God never, or almost never, do this. For if we knew more, God 
could safely intervene more frequently for the sake of preventing or relieving 
suffering. 
I come now to a second objection, equally familiar, but less troublesome 
in the present context. According to this objection, the existence of first-order 
harms is a logically necessary condition for the development of certain sec-
ond-order goods; e.g., such virtues as generosity and courage. Applied to the 
present line of thought, the argument would be that in order to make possible 
the flourishing of these valuable virtues, God had to create in us a certain 
degree of innate nastiness, and a defective intelligence. He thereby insures 
an abundance of the evils which provoke virtue and test its mettle. 
I hope it will be agreed on all sides that the amount of evil is, in its 
distribution and its intensity, far in excess of that necessary for the encour-
agement of virtue. For one thing, this need for evil can be and is served to a 
significant degree by existing natural evils. Moreover, the extent to which 
these virtues flourish is not always or necessarily an increasing function of 
the intensity of the harms they address. It is arguably true that courage is 
proportional to the degree of perceived danger faced, but the same cannot be 
said for, e.g., the relation between generosity and need. 
In addition, we must not forget that while these virtues have an intrinsic 
value, they have worth also, and largely, for their instrumental value in 
overcoming the very evils which are their precondition. Finally, we may 
remark that (if experience is any guide) an abundance of intelligence and 
natural generosity are centrally important characteristics among those which 
enable an agent to develop these virtues. The more richly endowed we are 
with these, the more rapidly and easily we learn virtue. Hence if God had 
endowed us more richly in these respects, we would have required less ex-
perience of evil to become virtuous. 
This brings me finally-and I fear altogether too briefly-to a third and 
final defense of theism, one that I believe poses the most serious objection 
to my argument. The first two objections purported to show that God would 
have sufficient reason to create or allow the evils which result from our 
stupidity and cupidity. The third objection, which has lately been advanced 
by Steven Wykstra,l1 retrenches at the second line of defense. The fact that 
these evils (and others) might initially appear to be gratuitous is not, accord-
ing to a principle Wykstra calls CORNEA, evidence at all that they are 
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gratuitous. CORNEA, or the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access, is 
a principle that Wykstra expresses thusY 
On the basis of cognized situation S, human H is entitled to claim "It appears 
that p" only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive 
faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, S would 
likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. 
As the sentence 'It appears that p' is used in CORNEA, it means roughly that 
there is genuine evidence which makes it reasonable to believe that p is true. 
Applied to the case at hand, CORNEA allows us to say that the evils that 
result from human stupidity and cupidity appear to be gratuitous only if it 
would be reasonable to suppose that our situation with respect to the evils 
we find would be discernably different if there were a God (and hence no 
gratuitous evil). Wykstra then proceeds to argue that, because of the enor-
mous gap between the understanding of a theistic God and our own, we are 
in no position to suppose that we have the ability to judge gratuitousness 
relative to God's morally guided purposes. Although it may seem, as a result 
of the considerations put forward above, that God was derelict in constituting 
us with the nature we have, we cannot reasonably claim sufficient penetration 
into God's purposes or the means necessary to achieve these, to judge whether 
it is even probable that any given evil is gratuitous. 
It will be seen at once that CORNEA, given this kind of employment, is 
an extremely powerful predator which theodicy can employ for devouring 
candidate arguments from evil. Not only does it provide an all-purpose de-
fense against such arguments; it is also an effective weapon quite indiscrim-
inately against the pretensions of human reason when it raises questions about 
the Divine Nature. Honoring its apparent source, we might call this defense 
Job's Justification, but I shall call it, a bit uncharitably perhaps, Wykstra's 
Weasel. 
Does the inscrutability of the Divine Will, or Wykstra's Weasel, achieve its 
intended end? I think not. To see where the difficulty lies, we need to focus 
on the fact that the only sort of condition that eXCUlpates God with respect 
to the existence of an evil, is one that associates that evil with an equal or 
greater good (or avoidance of equal or greater harm) as a matter of logical 
necessity. That an evil condition is causally necessary for the occurrence of 
a good gives God no excuse for permitting it, no matter how great the result-
ing good. For God is omnipotent. David Hume was sensitive to this point, 
but Wykstra thinks that logical necessity may, for all we know, "account for" 
all the evils we see. 
Certainly logical necessity can account for some of the evils we see. It can 
account for the existence of some gratuitous delegated evil. It can account 
for the amount of evil minimally necessary to make logically possible the 
existence and development of certain virtues. It can account for those evils 
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that are the minimal byproduct of the existence of regularities such as are a 
logical precondition of our learning from experience. These cases, we have 
seen, cannot account for all the evils we know of. A Wykstrian theist, for 
example, is committed to holding that it would have been wrong for God to 
have endowed us with enough wisdom to understand why it would have been 
wrong to have that wisdom. But perhaps there are other goods such that these 
additional evils, for example human stupidity or the suffering of William 
Rowe's burned fawn,13 are logically necessary conditions for them. Why 
should we suppose that, if there are such goods and such necessary connec-
tions, we would be aware of them? After all, the necessary connection be-
tween the possible existence of delegated evil and the good of free will is not 
so transparently evident that it has not been denied by some philosophers. 
It may help to clarify Wykstra's solution if we classify the types of relation 
that can hold between an evil and its associated exculpating good. Let us call 
the evil E and the exculpating good G. G can be an event whose goodness 
equals or outweighs the badness of E; or it can be the absence (Le. prevention) 
of some evil equal to or greater than E in badness. 
If G is to justify E, it seems that one of the following relations must obtain 
between them: 14 
or 
or 
or 
(1) E is logically necessary for G, 
(2) E is logically necessary for the causal possibility of G; 
(3) The causal possibility of E is logically necessary for G; 
(4) The causal possibility of E is logically necessary for the causal possibility 
ofG. 
So (1) is only the most obvious way in which E and G might be associated. 
In fact the cases theists have cited typically involve one of the other relations 
listed. Thus, the free will defense makes use of the fact that the causal 
possibility of certain evil deeds is a logically necessary condition of free 
agency (case 3), and certain virtues are such that the causal possibility of 
their development and exercise requires (logically) the existence of evil (case 
2). In general, God's providence must involve either creating a good G di-
rectly or creating a world in which G can be brought about; and if this requires 
the existence of an evil E, then God can either create E directly or create a 
world in which E can be brought about, relying on the likelihood that it will 
be. 
Contra posing now, we can see that for each and every evil E, the theist is 
committed to holding that there is an outweighing good G such that either: 
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(1) Not-E entails not-G; 
or 
(2) Not-E entails that G is causally impossible; 
or 
(3) That E is causally impossible entails not-G; 
or 
(4) That E is causally impossible entails that G is causally impossible. 
Now human beings share a large amount of ignorance and aggressiveness; 
and fawns suffer. God has either produced these states of affairs directly, or 
allowed them to come about. So according to the theist, their non-existence, 
or the (causal) impossibility of their existing logically entails15 the non-exis-
tence (or causal impossibility of) some immense good. It will suffice to focus 
on form (3). This has the strongest premise and weakest conclusion, hence is 
the weakest claim the theist requires. Our problem is that we cannot see any 
such entailment. Is it that our understanding of such propositions as 'That 
fawn does not suffer' and 'It is not possible for that fawn to suffer' is so weak 
that we fail to do this? Might the explanation be that the goods in question are 
ones of which we cannot conceive?16 And what does this conceptual deficiency 
on our part imply about our situation as morally responsible agents? 
Although he does not mention Wykstra, Brice Wachterhouser17 strikes the 
correct theme here when he argues that this kind of defense of theism leads 
to moral skepticism. However Wachterhouser focuses on the question 
whether certain kinds of evil could be morally justified as means to any 
conceivable ends. If by the means/ends relation Wachterhouser means a 
causal relation, then his argument, whatever its merits or flaws, is not directly 
to our purpose here. A theist who employs Wykstra's Weasel is claiming that 
every evil whatsoever has associated with it, as a matter of logical necessity 
and not merely as a means, some greater good, or the prevention of some 
greater evil, which justifies it. In some cases of evil we understand what this 
necessary connection is; but other evils (e.g. the suffering of the fawn) are 
such that we cannot even imagine what sorts of goods could be connected to 
them in the requisite way. 
To ferret out what is at stake when Wykstra's Weasel is placed in the service 
of theodicy, we need to consider two questions: (1) what evidence, if any, 
does our inability or failure to conceive of the relevant justifying goods 
provide for the conclusion that no such goods exist; and (2) what kind of 
moral skepticism would such a conceptual failure entail, if these goods do 
indeed exist? 
By way of addressing (1), I introduce here a principle quite closely analo-
gous to CORNEA, that arguably provides a sufficient condition for an agent 
H's being justified in asserting that it appears that a proposition p is false: 
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(*) If H has done what is within his power by way of seeking confinning 
evidence for p, if H has found no such evidence, and if the best explanation 
or every explanation H has for this lack of evidence entails that p is false, 
then H is justified in claiming that it appears that not-p.IS 
Plainly, (*) can be applied only where there is a best explanation that has the 
required feature, or where every explanation does. Suppose, for example, 
someone suggests that there is a mouse residing in my desk. I search my desk 
for signs of a mouse; I look in all the drawers, etc., but find no mouse, no 
mouse droppings or nest, no mousy odor or other signs of mously presence. 
Here, surely, the best reason that can be given for the lack of evidence is the 
lack of a mouse, so I am justified in asserting that there appears not to be a 
mouse domiciled in the desk-indeed I am justified in asserting that there is 
no such mouse. 
But on the other hand, if a scientist looks for a black hole in the galaxy in 
Andromeda, and finds no sign of any, we may have several ways of explaining 
this: that there are no black holes, or that present instruments are not sensitive 
enough, or that not enough is understood about black holes to know how to 
go about reliably detecting them. If no one of these explanations recommends 
itself as best, or if the one that does, does not entail the nonexistence of black 
holes, then the application of (*) cannot provide the scientist with a warrant 
for asserting that there appear to be no black holes in that galaxy. 
In many cases however it will not be clear whether there is a best expla-
nation that entails that p is false. For example, large-scale searches through 
the natural numbers have never turned up an even number that is not the sum 
of two primes. Is the best explanation of this that there are no counter-exam-
ples to Goldbach's conjecture, or is it an equally good explanation that we 
have not looked far enough? Similarly, is the lack of any counterexample to 
Church's Thesis concerning computability best explained by supposing that 
every computable function is Turing-computable, or are there equally eligible 
alternative explanations? 
With these last two cases, which involve our knowledge of logical entail-
ments, we move closer to the issue at hand. For our question, given (*), is: 
Is the best explanation for the fact that we cannot conceive of any justifying 
good associated with, e.g., human stupidity or Rowe's suffering fawn, that 
there is no such good? 
I think it is unclear what the answer to this question should be. On the one 
side it is tempting to say that our conceptual grasp of the relevant descrip-
tions-that is, of good and evil, of suffering, stupidity and so on-is suffi-
ciently good that if there were goods associated as a matter of logic with the 
above evils, we would have hit upon them. But of course we believe the basic 
notions associated with number theory are also quite conceptually transpar-
ent, yet there are theorems about numbers that we do not and never will know. 
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The theist can answer question (1), therefore, by asserting that our inability 
to conceive of relevant justifying goods for the problem-cases does not give 
us strong evidence for their non-existence. 19 But what does this answer com-
mit him to with respect to the issue of moral skepticism? 
It is a fact that there are truths-perhaps important truths-about numbers, 
sets, and the like which we do not know; but this does not show that we fail 
to understand what numbers and sets are, that we have no clear grasp of these 
notions. Similarly, a theist can deny that supposing some evils to be analyt-
ically associated with equal or greater goods of which we cannot conceive, 
or whose analytical connection to evil escapes us, entails skepticism with 
respect to our grasp of moral concepts. Perhaps we can understand quite 
adequately what it means for suffering to be intrinsically evil, without appre-
hending its necessary connection to some good, even as we can understand 
what sets are, without apprehending some of the truths of set theory. 
However there is one respect in which the moral case and the mathematical 
one are not analogous. In matters of morals, we seek to know what the total 
good and evil associated with contemplated states of affairs are, for it is this 
which determines whether those states are to be desired, and whether we 
should seek to bring them about. But if our knowledge of the moral value of 
these states of affairs is as radically defective as the theist has to claim -states 
of affairs which are not only common but often within our power to produce 
or prevent-then we have indeed lost our grip upon the possibility of using 
moral judgments as a guide for action and evaluation. 
It is worth emphasizing two points with respect to this conclusion. First, 
the skepticism it implies applies to our evaluation of states of affairs which 
we judge to be morally desirable as well as to those we judge to be evil. If 
we admit that overriding but un imagined goods may be necessarily associated 
with what appear to be evil conditions, then we must equally admit the 
possibility that unknown overriding evils necessarily accompany what is 
apparently good. The theist is still in a position to maintain that his opponent 
has failed to demonstrate the existence of gratuitous evil; but in employing 
Wykstra's Weasel, he has forfeited the right to make any moral judgments of 
the all-things-considered variety. 
Secondly, the skepticism to which the theist falls prey here is not a skep-
ticism with respect to causal or ends/means considerations. His problem is 
not the generally admitted difficulty in forecasting the consequences of an 
action, but rather an inability to understand deep conceptual connections 
between goods and evils, or connections between their very natures.20 
If under these circumstances the theist wishes to maintain his conception 
of himself as a free and morally competent agent, where can he tum for 
guidance? One suggestion I wish to discuss briefly has been offered by 
Marilyn McCord Adams. 21 As I understand Adams, it is not our station as 
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human beings to make all-things-considered moral judgments. These are 
God's province. As his creatures, we have a more lowly vocation, which is 
to carry out as well as we can the moral commandments he has expressly 
given us. More than this God does not (and of course morally cannot) demand 
of us. Of course God has to publish these commandments so that we can 
know them; no doubt the text of this revelation is to be found in a favored 
source, which for Adams is the Bible. So Adams' Admonition, as I shall call 
it, seems to boil down to this: Obey the moral commandments of the Bible, 
and you will have fulfilled your moral duty. The rest is God's providence. 
How satisfactory a solution does Adams' Admonition provide? There are 
two problems with which it leaves us. The first is that it reduces our stature 
as morally responsible beings in a very serious way, if the free will defense 
is to be upheld. The second is that it raises the familiar problem of the 
authenticity of the alleged revelation to which appeal must be made. 
God's commands could take the form of strictly prescribing or enjoining 
certain actions, regardless of the consequences foreseeable by us. But if they 
were of this form, our moral freedom (beyond decisions as to how to apply 
the Law in particular circumstances22) would consist of nothing more than 
the ability to choose whether to obey or not. Deliberation with a view to the 
consequences of action would be morally irrelevant. But such a limited form 
of moral responsibility as this would hardly suit the "station" of an intelligent 
dog, let alone agents such as ourselves. 
So suppose God requires us to contemplate certain foreseeable ends in 
choosing how to act. We have, by hypothesis, no all-things-considered un-
derstanding of whether these ends are good ones or ill: for that we must trust 
God. God may enjoin our causing a fawn to suffer, even if that suffering is 
an all-things-considered desirable state of affairs; but presumably He will not 
prescribe actions which normally lead to all-things-considered evil. However 
in the essential respect this position has no advantage over the first one. True, 
we would now have responsibility for gauging the effectiveness of various 
means to prescribed ends. But still we would have no real understanding of 
the value of those ends: it would not fall to our lot to perceive the overall 
good or evil of any state of affairs. Lacking this knowledge, we would be 
unable to choose the good because it is good-and hence would not be 
responsible for doing so. How, indeed, could we know that it is good to obey 
God? Moreover, God would have to specify all the ends we are to seek and 
avoid, or give us algorithms for determining these in any situation we actually 
encounter. 
Perhaps the mathematical analogy can once again here help to clarify what 
is at stake. Suppose there were mathematical calculations we were forced by 
our circumstances to make; and suppose we are given rules for making these 
calculations by a superior being who assures us that the rules are correct. But 
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at the same time, while we can learn the algorithm by rote, we are incapable 
of understanding its validity. How should we characterize such a circum-
stance? It is clear that although we remain free agents in a certain sense-we 
can choose to follow the algorithm or ignore it-we are, in another sense, 
reduced to robots: that is, we cannot give any mathematical reasons for 
preferring the one choice to the other. We are not, in this domain, mathemat-
ically competent. 
A few pages back, I agreed with the theist's point that, if God were to 
interfere in human affairs by causing every evil-intentioned action to misfire, 
He would cripple our moral autonomy. For in that case, although we would 
be free in a certain sense-we could always try to bring about harm-the 
futility of such choices would deprive us of the possibility of regarding our 
choices as involving serious responsibility for the welfare of others and of 
ourselves. In interfering, God would be demonstrating a lack of moral respect 
for us; and our self-respect would be correspondingly undermined. 
But if God required us to follow moral algorithms, perhaps with the guar-
antee that everything would tum out for the best if we do so; and if He denied 
us the ability to understand the grounds for his commands, then we would be 
equally crippled. Though free to obey or disobey, we would be denied the 
possibility of supplying moral grounds for our choices: God would have 
deprived us of a fundamental condition for respecting ourselves as moral 
creatures. If God has denied us a comprehension of the logical connections 
between the goods and evils we must choose, and compensates that denial 
with an assurance that choices made in good faith and in obedience to Him 
will by His providence result in greater good than ill, then He deprives us of 
moral autonomy, just surely as we would be deprived by a providential neu-
tralization of evil intentions. As a result, we would not be morally competent. 
The second problem, that of establishing the authenticity of a given body 
of commandments, is familiar. In the case of Jews and Christians, the attempt 
to establish the moral authority of canonical scripture is additionally bur-
dened by the pervasive presence of passages which are ethically problematic 
or repugnant. I shall not comment upon this much-discussed issue, except to 
say that I believe Adams' Admonition may be the best way to rescue theism 
from the untoward side-effects of Wykstra's Weasel, but that the application 
of her admonition requires the theist to have positive grounds for the claim 
that he posseses an adequately complete set of moral instructions from God.23 
There is, to be sure, one other escape from these side-effects. As a final 
defense, a theist might adopt the unorthodox view that God has sovereignty 
over moral norms, in the sense that righteousness consists solely in an action's 
being in accord with God's arbitrary will. Then whatever God wills or permits 
is ipso facto morally acceptable. If God has not chosen to give us a secure 
revelation of his will to guide our actions, then that is no fault in God. If He 
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chooses to make us aggressive and imperfectly wise, if He chooses to let the 
fawn suffer-from none of these can the imputation of moral defectiveness 
be lodged against God. I shall not explore this final path here, but content 
myself with the observation that it is not one which will lead the theist beside 
the still waters. 
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NOTES 
1. Evil whose possibility is not logically necessary as a precondition or consequence of 
some equal or greater good or the avoidance of some equal or greater harm, I shall call 
gratutitous evil. An evil is also gratuitous if, although logically necessary for some greater 
good or the prevention of some greater harm, an even greater overall felicity can be 
achieved by foregoing the evil with its associated benefit in favor of some other benefit 
thereby made logically possible. Evil that exists and is made possible by the existence of 
free agents other than God I shall call delegated evil. The problem of evil has since 
Plantinga been commonly taken to depend upon the claim that there is gratuitous un-
delegated evil. But I shall argue that, even granting the free will defense, there is delegated 
evil that is both gratuitous and preventible by God. 
2. If anyone denies that we know this, it makes no difference to my argument, for I 
claim that God should have endowed us with certain innate dispositions and capacities 
that would be relateively resistant to environmental degradation. 
3. I should note, however, that Richard Swinvurne, on pp. 96-7 of "The Problem of 
Evil," in Stuart C. Brown, ed., Reason and Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977) holds that being born with innate dispositions to pursue the good would constitute 
a kind of limitation on our freedom. In a passage contrasting the option God has to create 
us with moral dispositions and to create us so that naturally occurring signs (pains) warn 
us of harm, he remarks that the former, but not the latter option has the demerit of 
"imposing a moral character" upon agents-thereby limiting their freedom to fashion their 
own moral character. Swinburne does not linger over the question whether the capacity 
to suffer sever pain-together with the existence of environments which cause it-is not 
equally effective, even coercive, in shaping moral character, for better or for worse. But 
we need not concern ourselves whether such shaping is or is not the result of free responses 
to the experience of pain, for in any case, the plain fact is that we come into this world 
with a range of morally non-neutral innate dispositions. If the creation of creatures with 
such dispositions is something a God ought not to do, then our existence is an embarass-
ment to theodicy. 
4. It does not follow-and I do not hold-that in so doing God would causally guarantee 
the diminution of human evil. The connection between nature and nurture on the one hand, 
and human action on the other, is nevertheless strong enough to ensure the general 
empirical claims on which my argument depends. This we know if we know any induc-
tively supported truths, and we all use this knowledge to guide our rearing of children. 
Thus it will not do to object that any world God could create with agents gentler and more 
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intelligent (see below) than we will be such that it is logically and causally possible for 
that world to have turned out worse than ours: could it not, the objection goes, be the case 
that God, forseeing the history of each of the agent-containing worlds he could create, 
picked ours as the best of the lot? Indeed it could. The force of my argument is not to 
show that this situation is impossible, but that it is extremely unlikely. The argument is 
therefore Bayesian. Unless the prior probability of God's existence is extremely high, the 
great improbability that a world should exist with agents such as we are, on the hypothesis 
of God's existence, shows that hypothesis to be improbable. 
5. Respecting which see Section II. 
6. I mean intelligence in the broad sense in which it is the capacity to acquire under-
standing, including, of course, moral understanding. There arises here the important 
question to what extent knowledge of non-moral facts enhances, or is necessary for, moral 
understanding, and for a good will-a question I shall not pursue here. But even if the 
two are independent, so that intelligence may equally easily be pressed into the-service of 
harm, it is no argument against me that God would have risked greater delegated evil by 
having made us smarter. For I am claiming that he should also have made us sufficiently 
kinder to offset this risk. 
7. At least with respect to the past and with respect to the laws of nature. I shall leave 
out of consideration perfect knowledge of the future and of other conscious agents' 
thoughts: these raise difficult issues. 
8. Arguably, no omniscient creature could be considered human, as Del Lewis has 
reminded me. In that case, my specualtion here can be taken to suggest a reason God has 
for not creating human agents at all. If the possession of omniscience by finite beings is 
for some reason conceptually impossible, then God should have gien His creatures an 
intelligence that at least encompasses a full knowledge of moral norms and their justifi-
cation, and knowledge adequate to predict the probable long-range consequences of 
actions. There is, so far as I can see, no conceptual impossibility in the possession by finite 
beings of such knowledge as that (or in the possession of the means by which to acquire 
it with reasonable effort). 
9. E.g., Richard Swinburne, The Existence o/God (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979), 
pp. 146-47. 
10. Steven E. Boer, "The Irrelevance of the Free Will Defense," Analyses, vol. 38 
(1978), pp. 110-12. 
11. It is not my purpose to refute Boer's claim in this paper. But briefly, it seems to me 
that if God were to intervence in human affairs in this way, then the "freedom" we would 
possess would be morally truncated, since we would soon learn that achieving evil ends 
was for us no genuine option. 
12. Swinburne, loco cit. 
13. Eleonore Stump in "The Problem of Evil," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 2 (1985), pp. 
392-423, thinks it arguable that this evil is optimal in bringing human souls (perhaps after 
death) to salvation, but that is a different matter. To take a familiar, if extreme, example, 
we should remind ourselves that the conditions in Auschwitz virtually destroyed the moral 
integrity of all but a very few of those interned there. 
14. Steven Wykstra, "The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguements from Suffering: 
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On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance', International Journal for the Philosophy of 
Religion, vol. 16 (1984), pp. 73-93. 
15. Ibid., p. 85. 
16. See William Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16 (1979), pp. 335-41. 
17. More strictly, let 'E' and 'G' in (1)-(4) represent propositions to the effect that the 
evil and good, respectively, occur. If there are other modal relations between propositions 
describing the existence of goods and evils, this list would have to be expanded. But I do 
not believe that any of the plausible candidates for such relations affect my argument. See 
also footnote 18. 
18. A full discussion of (1)-(4) would require consideration of the various species of 
necessity by which God might be bound. To give the theist full leeway here, I shall take 
'logically entails' as broadly as possible: A entails B just in case A necessitates B in any 
sense stronger than causal necessity. Whether logical necessity is the only such species of 
necessity or not, I am assuming that these necessary relations obtain in virtue of the 
identity conditions for the goods and evils they connect. 
19. There are two possibilities: either we cannot recognize the relevant goods, or their 
relevance; or at least we have not done so. Wykstra's remarks suggest the fonner possi-
bility, but the arguments which follow apply also in the latter case, so long as these goods 
(or their relevance) remain unidentified. 
20. Brice Wachterhauser, "The Problem of Evil and Moral Skepticism," International 
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 17 (1985), pp. 167-74. 
21. Perhaps (*) is not quite sufficient for my purpose; perhaps a clause needs to be 
added, concerning best explanations, to the effect that the explanation in question is not 
merely the best H has (i.e., has thought of), but the best, relative to H's total evidence, 
that there is, or at least the best that a nonnal human agent can be expected to conceive 
of. If so, let (*) be thus understood. 
22. Rowe, "The Empirical Argument from Evil," in Robert Audi and William Wain-
wright, eds. , Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 244, invoking Swin-
burne, The Existence of God, appeals here to principle of credulity, to the effect that if 
there do not seem to be any outweighing goods, then we are justified in believing there 
are none. I disagree. Epistemological problems are not solved by invoking ad hoc 
principles, no matter how well they may reflect the way we actually fonn beliefs. 
23. It may be quite reasonably objected that this is too strong: rather than know the total 
good and evil some state of affairs entails, we need merely have adequately justified beliefs 
about roughly how much good and evil are involved. I shall accept this correction, but it 
does nothing to ameliorate the present difficulty. What the Wykstra defense requires is the 
supposition that we are in no position to justify our estimates of the good and evil 
necessarily involved in states of affairs, and that our best estimates of this are in many 
cases wildly in error. 
24. It might be said that this species of moral skepticism introduces no new or special 
handicap, since our lack of knowledge of the long-range consequences of our actions 
already renders impossible all-things-considered moral evaluations, of a consequentialist 
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sort, of those actions. If this is granted, however, it serves merely to reinforce the earlier 
complaint that God did not give us enough understanding. There are, however, two sharp 
differences between the two kinds of moral skepticism at issue. first, deontologists might 
plausibly claim to be free of the problem just raised for consequentialism, but they cannot 
escape the difficulty engendered by Wykstra's Weasel. To possess a good will it is not 
enough to merely wish or hope abstractly for the good; one must also direct one's will 
toward specific ends understood to be good. but the deployment of Wykstra's Weasel 
required by the present defense of theism implies that we are quite radically lacking in 
this sort of understanding. It will not do either in this circumstance to will as best we know 
how, once we face our inability to know whether what we will is good or frightfully bad. 
Here the good will must shrink from willing any specific action. The second difference is 
that the Weasel-engendered skepticism is much deeper and more radical. The con-
sequentialist can admit that we know little about the long-range consequences of a 
particular action, but still maintain with some plausibility that we know something (and 
can hope to learn more) about what the common significant consequences of a given kind 
of action are. Appealing to the general experience of mankind, he can hope to formulate 
some rule-of-thumb guides to action. But Wkystra's Weasel confronts us with the possi-
bility of goods and evils, achievable by us, which we are unable to even conceive. Hence 
there appears to be not hope of bringing to bear on our decisions a kind of inductive 
wisdom gleaned from the general experience of humans. 
25. Marilyn McCord Adams, "Reemptive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the Problem 
of Evil, in Robert Audi and William Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief, and 
Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), pp. 265-66; also in personal conversation. Adams' development of this idea 
in (1986) is extremely brief and rather oblique. I hope I have not misrepresented her, but 
if I have, the view I propose here can be considered on its own merits. 
26. Decisions abouth whether, e.g., the prohibition of killing covers military conflict or 
euthanasia, or what 'honoring' one's parents prescribes, can sometimes be settled on 
philological grounds. But usually, it is a question of matching a given interpretation to our 
independent conceptions of good and evil. The theist must now abandon the latter strategy. 
27. Our lack of understanding of God's purposes may be, as Wykstra would have it, at 
least as great as a month-old child's lack of comprehension of its parent's purposes. But 
in one respect the comparison is inapt: unlike the child, we have a well-developed sense 
of justice. Adam's Admonition bespeaks a religious attitude which deserves respect, at 
least toward those who have been true to it in the face of great personal suffering. But 
since we cannot, at least in this life, see the justice in many evils, it also invites a very 
different attitude: rebellion. 
